On the relationship between problems in the philosophy of mind and methodological fallacies
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2025-10-4-99-105
EDN: FQOVEV
Abstract
The paper examines the relationship between certain problems in the philosophy of mind. The discussion begins by identifying methodological obstacles in empirical consciousness research: the mereological fallacy and the fallacy of conflating levels of abstraction. Theoretical issues are addressed: the mind-body problem, the unity of consciousness problem, and the binding problem, situating them within a broader context and comparing them with one another. These problems are classified on the types of relations they explain, which are divided into inter-type and intra-type, as well as vertical and horizontal relations. By describing the relationships between these problems, the author demonstrates their close interconnectedness, which precludes treating them in isolation. The pivotal role of the unity of consciousness problem and the binding problem in research on the mind-body problem is highlighted, particularly in the context of the search for neural correlates of consciousness, with an emphasis on the importance of vertical relations. The relevance of this interconnectedness is underscored by the presence of methodological errors. In conclusion, it is argued that the question of the intersection of these problems can impact the formulation of hypotheses and the selection of research directions within the program of identifying neural correlates of consciousness.
About the Author
M. S. Sysoev
RAS Institute of Philosophy
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
SYSOEV Matvey Sergeyevich, Researcher of the Contemporary Western Philosophy Department
Moscow, Goncharnaya St., 12/1, 109240
AuthorID (RSCI): 979250
ResearcherID: 114047
AuthorID (SCOPUS): 58555260100
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Review
For citations:
Sysoev M.S. On the relationship between problems in the philosophy of mind and methodological fallacies. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity. 2025;10(4):99-105. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2025-10-4-99-105. EDN: FQOVEV
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