In defence of the standard psychological theory: can a person be a type?
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-4-99-115
EDN: MSYYLB
Abstract
The paper presents a defense of the standard psychological theory of personal identity against Mark Walker’s criticism of it. Walker claims that the conceptual tools of standard psychological theory of personal identity are insufficient to solve the problematic cases of branching in the context of moral and legal responsibility questions, and argues in favor of an approach to these problems that involves the type/token distinction. In the current paper I argue against Walker that the approach he suggests is untenable, and that the conceptual tools of standard psychological theory are sufficient to provide an adequate analysis of the cases mentioned.
About the Author
A. V. Mertsalov
Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Mertsalov Andrey Viktorovich, Editor of Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies; Director of Center for Consciousness Studies of Philosophy Faculty
AuthorID (RSCI): 1036246
AuthorID (SCOPUS): 57196065953
Moscow
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Review
For citations:
Mertsalov A.V. In defence of the standard psychological theory: can a person be a type? Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity. 2023;8(4):99-115. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-4-99-115. EDN: MSYYLB
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