Metaethical implications of illusionism
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2026-11-1-84-100
EDN: OLUKCJ
Abstract
According to illusionism, there is no phenomenal consciousness, only an illusion of it. Since the phenomenal character of experience plays an important role in explaining and justifying its normative status, illusionism faces a normative problem. The problem is that illusionism, by denying phenomenal experience, potentially undermines our moral commitments. In this article, I defend the normative problem and consider solutions to it proposed by François Kammerer, Keith Frankish, Artem Besedin, Maxim Gorbachev, Artem Iunusov, and Taras Tarasenko. As I show, none of these solutions is satisfactory. I conclude by offering two alternative solutions that either weaken illusionism or accept antirealist implications for metaethics.
About the Author
K. E. Morozov
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences; Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
MOROZOV Konstantin Evgenyevich, Junior Researcher of the Ethics Department; Postgraduate at the Ethics Department, Philosophy Faculty
Moscow
AuthorID (RSCI): 1225399
AuthorID (SCOPUS): 58648298500
ResearcherID: LMP-8679-2024
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For citations:
Morozov K.E. Metaethical implications of illusionism. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity. 2026;11(1):84-100. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2026-11-1-84-100. EDN: OLUKCJ
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