A knowledge first virtue reliabilism OF Christoph Kelp
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-1-110-117
Abstract
This article examines Christoph Kelp’s project of epistemology, which combines the approaches of Timothy Williamson’s knowledge-first approach and Ernest Sosa’s virtue reliabilism. Arguments are given in favour of the position that Kelp’s theory of competence is a quite productive and substantially self-contained epistemological concept. It allows to construct special epistemologies and to analyse the competence of non-human actors.
About the Author
A. M. KardashBelarus
KARDASH Aleksey Mikhaylovich, Postgraduate
AuthorlD (RSCI): 1145532;
ResearcherlD: AGN-9675-2022;
Minsk
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Review
For citations:
Kardash A.M. A knowledge first virtue reliabilism OF Christoph Kelp. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity. 2023;8(1):110-117. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-1-110-117
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