Is Romantic Self-Love Possible? / trans. from Engl. A. V. Nekhaev
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-3-118-123
EDN: OQYRNQ
Abstract
The essay examines the metaphysical possibility of romantic self-love. It makes difference between two forms of such love feeling like de re and de dicto. Based on this difference, the impossibility of romantic self-love de dicto is demonstrated, since this would violate one of the constitutive conditions of such a love feeling — the requirement of the numerical distinctness between the lover and the beloved.
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Review
For citations:
McGinn C. Is Romantic Self-Love Possible? / trans. from Engl. A. V. Nekhaev. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity. 2024;9(3):118-123. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-3-118-123. EDN: OQYRNQ
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