This article addresses a normative challenge for illusionism. It arises from the acceptance of sentientism — a theory that affirms the moral significance of phenomenal states. Illusionism, which denies the existence of phenomenal consciousness, may prompt a revision of ethical frameworks. The author demonstrates that illusionism can preserve the moral relevance of subjective experiences without requiring the postulation of phenomenal properties.The research argues that the concepts of pain and pleasure can be redefined in functional and physicalist terms without losing their normative force. Illusionism offers a way to reconceptualize the moral status of subjective experience while avoiding metaphysical assumptions. Through the analysis of several thought experiments, it is shown that although the illusionist interpretation of pain denies the reality of phenomenal qualities, it can still explain why pain is considered an intrinsically bad state. Thus, illusionism is compatible with sentientism and does not contradict our moral intuitions.