This article is a critical response to Roman Kochnev’s Parfitian Teletransportation or Error Management and Andrei Nekhaev’s Teletransportation, Replication and Mereology. It defends the principle of the mereorganic continuity from the criticisms made by Kochnev and Nekhaev. First, the concept of survival is analyzed and how its meanings differ in ordinary speech and in Derek Parfit’s psychological theory of identity. Then, the context of the principle of the mereorganic continuity in the phenomenalist theory of identity is described. Based on this context, Kochnev’s and Nekhaev’s objections are refuted. In particular, it is shown that these objections are based on an incorrect interpretation of the principle and the role it should play in our theories of personal identity. It is concluded that the mereorganic continuity is a common- sense proposition that cannot be rejected without good reason, and neither Kochnev nor Nekhaev were able to offer such reasons.