sohimoОмский научный вестник. Серия "Общество. История. Современность"Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity2542-04882541-7983Омский государственный технический университет10.25206/2542-0488-2025-10-3-92-100ZZJVZZsohimo-215Research ArticleФИЛОСОФИЯВ защиту случайного знанияIncidental knowledge defendedhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9683-0601КардашА. М.KardashA. M.

Кардаш Алексей Михайлович, аспирант отдела теории познания и методологии науки

AuthorID (РИНЦ): 1145532

ResearcherID: AGN-9675-2022

г. Минск

Kardash Aleksey Mikhaylovich, Postgraduate of the Theory of Cognition and Methodology of Science Department

AuthorlD (RSCI): 1145532

ResearcherlD: AGN-9675-2022

Minsk

krdwalexei@gmail.comИнститут философии Национальной академии наук БеларусиInstitute of Philosophy, National Academy of Sciences of Belarus20253009202510392100Copyright © Кардаш А.М., 20252025Кардаш А.М.Kardash A.M.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://ois.omgtu.ru/jour/article/view/215

В статье анализируется эпистемическая случайность и обосновывается возможность случайного знания. Рассматривается, как минимальные концепции знания, отражающие различные базовые интуиции, работают в ситуациях, где имеется влияние случайности или удачных обстоятельств. На основании этого устанавливается различие между эпистемическим совпадением и случайностью эпистемической каузации. Оба вида эпистемической случайности являются более широкой альтернативой узкому пониманию эпистемической удачи, которое сложилось в современной эпистемологии. В качестве примера рассматривается влияние случайности эпистемической каузации на формирование интеллектуальных добродетелей.

The paper analyses epistemic happenstance and argues for the possibility of incidental knowledge. It considers how minimal concepts of knowledge, reflecting various basic intuitions, operate in situations where there is an influence of chance or fortunate circumstances. Based on this, a distinction is made between epistemic coincidence and epistemic causation randomness. Both types of epistemic happenstance are broader alternatives to the narrow understanding of epistemic luck that has developed in contemporary epistemology. As an example, the influence of the epistemic causation randomness on the formation of intellectual virtues is considered.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.