sohimoОмский научный вестник. Серия "Общество. История. Современность"Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity2542-04882541-7983Омский государственный технический университет10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-3-95-101PYOKKCsohimo-188Research ArticleФИЛОСОФИЯ. Позиции и А-ПозицииPHILOSOPHY. Pros and ConsНаказывать нельзя клонироватьPunish no clonehttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-9064-1175КочневР. А.KochnevR. L.

КОЧНЕВ Роман Леонидович, кандидат философских наук, старший преподаватель кафедры философии 

ResearcherID: AAZ-6320-2021

г. Тюмень.

KOCHNEV Roman Leonidovich, Candidate ofPhilosophical Sciences, Senior Lecturer of PhilosophyDepartment

Tyumen

r.l.kochnev@utmn.ruТюменский государственный университетUniversity of Tyumen2023300920238395101Copyright © Кочнев Р.А., 20232023Кочнев Р.А.Kochnev R.L.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://ois.omgtu.ru/jour/article/view/188

Статья представляет собой комментарий и дополнительное исследование к переводу на русский язык статьи Марка Уокера «Ветвление — это не баг, а фича: тождество личности и юридическая (моральная) ответственность», опубликованного в этом журнале. В статье рассматриваются сложности, с которыми сталкивается теория типов/токенов при анализе кейсов существования предметов искусства и личностей во времени. Предлагается альтернативное решение, основанное на идеях Дерека Парфита

This article is a commentary and supplementary study to the Russian translation of Mark Walker’s article «Branching Is Not a Bug; It’s a Feature: Personal Identity and Legal (and Moral) Responsibility» published in this journal. The article discusses the difficulties that type/token theory encounters when analyzing cases of the existence of art objects and persons over time. An alternative solution, based on the ideas of Derek Parfit, is proposed. 

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.