sohimoОмский научный вестник. Серия "Общество. История. Современность"Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity2542-04882541-7983Омский государственный технический университет10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-3-73-94PXTLYWsohimo-185Research ArticleФИЛОСОФИЯ. Позиции и А-ПозицииPHILOSOPHY. Pros and ConsНаказание (не)виновных?Punishing (Not)Innocent Persons?https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1358-743XНехаевА. В.NekhaevA. V.

НЕХАЕВ Андрей Викторович, доктор философскихнаук, доцент (Россия), профессор кафедры «История, философия и социальные коммуникации» ; профессор кафедры «Философия»; научный сотрудник Лаборатории логико-философских исследований Томского научного центра СО РАН, г. Томск.AuthorID (SCOPUS): 57211853279ResearcherID: M-7208-2016

г. Омск 

NEKHAEV Andrei Viktorovich, Doctor of PhilosophicalSciences, Associate Professor, Professor of History,Philosophy and Social Communications Department; Professor of Philosophy Department, Tyumen State University; Research Associate of the Laboratory of Logical and Philosophical Studies, Tomsk ScientificCenter, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences,RAS

Omsk

avnehaev@omgtu.ruОмский государственный технический университет; Тюменского государственного университетаOmsk State Technical University202330092023837394Copyright © Нехаев А.В., 20232023Нехаев А.В.Nekhaev A.V.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://ois.omgtu.ru/jour/article/view/185

В статье содержится критический анализ теории типов-токенов Марка Уокера. Данная теория призвана описать, объяснить и оправдать механизм, посредством которого морально-правовая ответственность может возлагаться на точные и полные дубликаты личностей. Однако защищаемый Уокером взгляд на личности как на абстрактные сущности наталкивается на ряд метафизических возражений. В качестве альтернативы на основе принципов агентского права разрабатывается новый подход к морально-правовой ответственности, в котором понятие виновного лица не требует тождества с лицом, совершившим виновное действие. 

This article provides a critical analysis of Mark Walker’s type-token theory. This theory purports to describe, explain, and justify the mechanism by which moral and legal responsibility can be attributed to exact and complete duplicates of persons. However, Walker’s defence of the view of persons as abstract entities is met with several metaphysical objections. Alternatively, a new approach to moral and legal responsibility is developed based on principles of agency law, in which the conception of a guilty person does not require identity with the person who committed the culpable act. 

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.