sohimoОмский научный вестник. Серия "Общество. История. Современность"Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity2542-04882541-7983Омский государственный технический университет10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-1-85-89REEWIVsohimo-121Research ArticleФИЛОСОФИЯ. ПровокацииАбсурдный утилитаризм = C. McGinn. Absurd UtilitarianismAbsurd UtilitarianismМакГиннK.McGinnС.

Оксфорд

Oxford

Колледж Иисуса, Оксфордский университет; Омский государственный технический университетВеликобританияJesus College, University of OxfordUnited Kingdom202430032024918589Copyright © МакГинн K., 20242024МакГинн K.McGinn С.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://ois.omgtu.ru/jour/article/view/121

В эссе содержится радикальная критика тотального утилитаризма действия. Последовательно реализуемый принцип максимизации совокупной полезности предполагает, что лучшим миром из тех, что мы можем создать (при некотором заданном объеме ресурсов R), будет мир с бесчисленными крысиными мозгами в бочках, перепрофилированными в сплошные центры удовольствия.

Ссылка на полный текст эссе: https://www.google.ru/books/edition/Philosophical_Provocations/OAQxDwAAQBAJ?hl=ru&gbpv=1&dq

The essay contains a radical critique of the total act utilitarianism. The consistent implementation principle of aggregate utility maximization suggests that the best world what we can create (with a given amount of resource R) would be a world with countless rat brains in vats converted into solid pleasure centers.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.